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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis proposes and analyzes the effects of a new method of distributing 
Sailors with critical skills among undermanned ratings. It focuses on the distribution of 
Operations Specialists (OSs) on DDG 51 Flt I destroyers. OSs are known for being 
underutilized when in port, and working longer hours than expected while deployed. The 
improved utilization of Sailors will result in a career path that supports work-life balance 
and eases the burden on recruiters to meet accession quotas. 
 The analysis uses a discrete event simulation model to determine the effects of a 
surge command option on manning. Sailors with in-demand skills can choose assignment 
to the surge command rather than assignment to a specific ship. To facilitate manning at 
the surge command, fewer billets are authorized on ships while they are not deployed. 
When a ship deploys, it draws Sailors from the surge command to supplement manning. 
Surge command tours are 24 months while regular sea tours are five years. The 
compressed tour minimizes underutilized man-hours on in-port ships while improving 
manning on deployed ships. 
 We conclude that a surge command provides increased deployment manning and 
decreased in-port manning, resulting in up to 315 fewer Sailors being under-utilized at 
any given time. Improved workload balance may result in increased retention. We 
recommend further studies to expand the scope of the model as well as studies to 
determine the effects of a surge command on Sailor retention. 
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Executive Summary
This thesis develops a proof of concept (POC) model for critical skilled sailor distribution in
undermanned sea duty ratings. Specifically, this thesis proposes and models a new system
of personnel assignment known as a surge command. A surge command is designed to
address workload imbalances in ratings that have little rating specific occupational work
requirements while in port but are undermanned and overworked while deployed. The POC
focuses on the Operations Specialists (OS) rating and models deployment cycles and OS
manning for DDG 51 Flt I destroyers.
Over the past century, anecdotal observations have indicated that overworked sailors and
airman fatigue can manifest itself as safety mishaps and deteriorated work quality. More
recently, research into work underload has emerged demonstrating that underload can be just
as detrimental as work overload. Recent Naval Postgraduate School theses have documented
Sailor workload and under-manning issues across the fleet. The effects of these documented
issues, when coupled with a rating that is known to have little rating-specific work while
in port and grueling work hours while underway, can significantly impact retention, which
further burdens manning issues. OSs are an example of a rating affected by this workload
imbalance. This thesis proposes a model that increases underway manning while reducing
manning during periods of in-port under-utilization for OS Sailors.
When the proposed surge command is utilized, in-port ship manning requirements are
reduced, and the billets are shifted back to the surge command.When a ship deploys, it draws
Sailors from the surge command to supplement manning shortfalls during deployment.
When the deployment ends, the surge Sailors return to the surge command and await
another deployment. During a regular sea tour, a Sailor is assigned to a single ship for four
or five years. During that time, the ship will normally deploy twice, accounting for about
12–18 months of underway time. However, in some cases, the timing works out such that a
Sailor may do only one deployment while assigned a sea tour. The remainder of the tour,
the ship is mostly in-port and OS Sailors are under-utilized. During assignment to a surge
command, a Sailor’s sea tour is proposed to be two years. During this time, the Sailor will
deploy twice, each time with a different ship as required. The Sailor will spend the same
12–18 months deployed that they would on a typical regular sea tour, but they will skip the
xiii
long periods of less than optimal occupational utilization. After their assignment to a surge
command, Sailors will continue the normal sea-shore rotation with assignment to a shore
command.
The fleet manning model proposed in this research is a discrete event simulation model
created using the DESpy package in Python. It models destroyers as they rotate between
maintenance periods in which they are not available to deploy, and periods of availability for
deployment and deployment. The ships aremodeled to bemannedwithOSSailors according
the DDG 51 Flt I ship manpower documents. Sailors in the model progress through their
careers by advancing in rank and moving between sea and shore duty assignments. The
model allows for Sailors to be assigned to a surge command when input parameters include
surge utilization data but assigns Sailors to a regular sea tour when the input data indicates
no surge utilization. Multiple replications are run at various surge utilization levels (between
zero and one hundred percent). Deployment manning levels are tracked to compare results
at each surge utilization level.
Our results indicate that the use of a surge command slightly improves deployment manning
levels. However, it has a significant impact on in-port manning levels. There are as many as
315 fewer Sailors assigned to non-deployed ships at a time, thereby decreasing under-utilized
man-hours. The little available occupational work on those ships can then be distributed
among fewer assigned Sailors, improving the under-utilization rate for the assigned Sailors.
As a POC, the results of this research are promising andwarrant further studies to investigate
the idea of a surge command. Further work should include reducing model simplifications
and assumptions to create a more detailed Sailor and ship models as well as use of the
optimization model in Appendix B. It should also include Sailor interviews to gauge the
interest in the surge concept and appropriate policy requirements to maximize the utility of
a surge command assignment process.
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The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has named Navy Sailors as one of his top priorities.
During his swearing-in speech, he talked of “taking care of our most important weapon
system: our Sailors and their families” (AirForce Magazine 2019, p. 1). Caring for Sailors
can include focusing on job fulfillment and satisfaction as well as on quality of life. As a
Junior Officer onboard an operational ship working directly with enlisted Sailors, it is easy
to identify areas for improvement. While deployed, many Sailors lack adequate sleep and
work over 81 hours a week (Fletcher 2018). Though the hours can be long, a Sailor can
expect to do one to two full six-month deployments during each sea tour assignment, based
on the current Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]
2014b). However, in some cases, the timing works out such that a Sailor may do only one
deployment during a sea tour. This is due to the mismatch between the 36-month OFRP
timeline and the 48- to 60-month sea tour assignment timeline.
Sailors spend the majority of their sea tours in port. While in port, the workload can vary
depending on the Sailor’s rate (skill set) and rating (skill set and pay grade combination)
and the ship’s readiness phase. Of particular interest are rates, or occupational skills, for
which the in-port workload is significantly different from the workload during deployments.
The mismatch in workload between the two periods can cause burnout during deployments
followed by boredom while in port (Hebb 1955; Game 2007). Both conditions can have
a negative impact on job fulfillment and, subsequently, retention. One rate that is espe-
cially susceptible to this imbalance is Operations Specialist (OS). The occupational skills
associated with the OS rating, such as contact identification and management, are directly
related to being underway. The requirement for OS-required skills is minimized while in
port, and the equipment OSs use while underway is maintained by other rates. This leads
to a minimal amount of in-rate work for OS Sailors during in-port periods. Often, they are
kept busy in cleaning their spaces, polishing ornamental brass around the ship, and assisting
other divisions in their cleaning and ship-preservation responsibilities. Such activities are
important in the upkeep of a ship, but they are not the essential skills that Sailors expect
to perform when they enlist in the Navy. Furthermore, the occupational skills for a rate are
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necessary to maintain, not just for proficiency, but for promotional purposes as well. When
a Sailor works outside of their skill area for an extended period leading into an advance-
ment exam, they are undoubtedly at a disadvantage compared to Sailors who are practicing
the skill daily. The combination of a lack of meaningful rate-specific work while in port
and diminished advancement opportunities may contribute to dissatisfaction, and reenlist
decisions.
Diminished retention can lead to fewer Sailors to fill billets on ships, so when a ship is
deployed, there are not enough OS Sailors to perform the required duties within the Navy
workweek as prescribed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (1967). The result often
observed across the fleet is for OS Sailors to maintain a “port and starboard” watch rotation
for the duration of a deployment. This rotation involves 6 hours on watch, and 6 hours
off watch. The off-watch hours include other divisional duties such as training and space
preservation, as well as ship-wide training such as general quarters and man-overboard
drills. Such a schedule can make it difficult to get adequate sleep and to maintain focus
throughout the entire watch. With too little rate-specific work while in port and too much
while deployed, OS is a prime rating to examine for improvements in line with the CNO’s
desire to care for our Sailors.
1.1 Scope
This thesis proposes a new methodology for distributing OS Sailors assigned to sea duty,
with the aim of improving deployment manning, and workload, while minimizing the
under-utilized hours of OS Sailors assigned to ships not deployed. This thesis demonstrates
a model intended to act as a proof of concept (POC) for the method of distribution, referred
to herein as a Surge command.
The model simplifies the fleet and the Sailors to the extent practicable for a POC and it only
examines the destroyer fleet and OS Sailors. If the POC is successful, the model can be
expanded to include other ship types and other rates, as appropriate. As a POC, this thesis
does not propose to show what the fleet manning will look like under the Surge command
distribution method. Rather, it demonstrates that utilizing the surge command can improve
deployment manning for OS division by decreasing the manning requirements on ships in
port. Furthermore, it demonstrates that deployment manning levels can be improved given
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the current, undermanned distribution of OS Sailors in the fleet.
1.2 Motivation
As a sea-centric rate, OSs expect to spend more time at sea than on shore duty. They
also expect to spend their sea tours assigned to a single ship executing the prescribed
maintenance-workups-deployment schedule, as do all other sea-going Sailors in the Navy.
However, that is not always the case for the most highly qualified OSs. Several factors
contribute to the problem, including low sea-manning levels, extreme personnel tempo
(PERSTEMPO) conditions while at sea, difficult schools required to attain the required
qualifications, and little rate-specific work while in port. The result is some OSs assigned to
one ship that is not deployed being cross-decked, or “lent,” to another ship that is deployed,
thereby increasing the amount of time those Sailors work in an increased PERSTEMPO
environment and are away from their family and friends.
When ships are undermanned during deployment, the workload required of each Sailor
increases proportional to the level of under-manning. The result is that OS Sailors stand
“port and starboard” watches. Their off-watch time is used for sleep, workouts, messing,
personal time, divisional work, and training. This schedule is often maintained throughout
the entire deployment. The cross-decked Sailors do not alleviate the under-manning problem
in the long-term. Rather, they are often brought in to bring an under-manned ship up to just
the bare minimum number of qualified Sailors required in order to deploy, a number that is
lower than the number of Sailors authorized for optimal execution of the rate’s requirements.
When Sailors decide whether they want to pursue more advanced Navy enlisted classifica-
tions (NECs), they cannot ignore the reality that the qualification is likely to increase the
time they spend on unplanned deployments. This in turn acts as to disincentivize Sailors
from pursuing the qualifications. For the Sailors who choose to attend the school anyway,
the attrition rate is high due to the difficulty of the school (Settles 2020). These two factors
contribute to under-manning issues. Specifically, they contribute to the under-manning of
Sailors with the critical skills of which ships require a minimum amount before the ship can
redeploy.
Finally, the lack of meaningful and skill-specific work available for OS Sailors while in port
can lead to apathetic or unsatisfied Sailors. This can negatively impact a Sailor’s reenlistment
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decision. While in port, OSs are often seen polishing the same brass pieces throughout the
ship every day. Or they are assigned to other divisions to support cleaning and preservation
of the ship. This work is certainly important, but marginalizes a Sailor’s enlistment expec-
tations. The lack of repetitive skill-specific work may contribute to a decreased proficiency
in the OS skill-sets, thus affecting a Sailor’s performance on advancement exams. Sailors
who continue to not advance eventually meet High Year Tenure policy limits and become
losses to the Navy (Navy Personnel Command [NPC] 2020a). These losses contribute to
manning shortages.
Currently, eligible Sailors can opt into the SeaDuty Incentive Pay (SDIP) incentive program,
which is designed to increase the at-sea manning levels of the most qualified OS skills.
However, this incentive program costs the Navy nearly half a million dollars each year
(Jessie 2020), and the result is the current state of manning: under-manned.
1.3 Research Question
This thesis compares two concepts of operations for OS Sailor assignment, the status quo
concept and the new surge concept, in order to determine whether deployment manning
levels can be improved using a new concept of operations for detailing. It determines
whether decreasing in-port manning levels to support surge command manning can result
in increased manning for deployments given the current number of OS Sailors in the fleet.
In both concepts of operation, all Sailors spend their first sea tour assigned to a specific
ship. For subsequent sea tours, they are assigned in the same manner in both concepts if the
Sailor does not choose assignment to the surge command. However, when a Sailor chooses
assignment to the surge command, they are not assigned to a specific ship. Instead, these
Sailors are available to supplement a ship’s assigned OS quota with qualified Sailors in
order to attain the required number of Sailors for the deployment. When the deployment is
over, the surge command Sailors return to the surge command, have a post-deployment rest
period, then are available to support another deployment.
Deployed ships maintain the samemanning requirements for both operating concepts. How-
ever, with the surge concept of operations, ships have different OS manning requirements
while in port. When a ship is not deployed, the manning requirement decreases to just
enough OS Sailors at each rating level to adequately contribute to in-port watch rotations,
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and the associated requirement of a full watch team able to get the ship underway. In order
to accomplish this, the surge command manned with the authorized billets removed from
in-port ships.
In order to compensate for the increased deployment frequency, assignment to the surge
command counts as a sea tour but is only 24 months long. This allows the assigned Sailors
to complete two deployments during their sea tour without the in-port periods of diminished
productivity and skill atrophy.
The 24-month surge tour results in two deployments in a condensed period for surge Sailors.
This could lead to Sailors not volunteering for the surge command, but the effect is mitigated
by several advantages inherent in assignment to the surge command. First, the deployments
are never a surprise, so families can plan and be prepared for the time away. Second, since
there is no need for the surge command to have a centralized or specific location, satellite
commands can be established at each of the Navy concentration areas. This give each Sailor
a lot of flexibility regarding their preferred duty location. Whether their preference is to be
sent to San Diego or to keep their family settled in Norfolk, the option is available through
the surge command. Third, more time at sea is associated with increased promotability, both
through the experience that comes with performing one’s job and through board precepts
that highlight arduous or challenging assignments for special consideration, as directed by
Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) (2019). Choosing assignment at the surge command can
increase a Sailor’s knowledge base and skill-set, and help the Sailor to stand out above their
peers on selection boards.
Currently, Sailors reach 20 years of service, and thus retirement eligibility, at the end of their
third sea tour. If a Sailor truncates their second sea tour by 36months by taking an assignment
to the surge command, their third sea tour takes them to only 17 years. Therefore, the final
three years required to become retirement eligible are on a shore assignment. Overall,
Sailors who retire at 20 years of service do three years fewer at sea, and three years more
on shore than their peers who do not serve at the surge command. For Sailors who serve
the maximum allowable 30 years, the three truncated years of sea duty are made up for by
a three-year sea tour at the end of their career.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis topic, including scope and motivation. Chapter 2 discusses
background information and related research. Chapter 3 describes themodels and the current
(status quo) and proposed (Surge) system operations. Chapter 4 summarizes the results of
the models. Chapter 5 discusses the implication of the results and suggests future work.
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CHAPTER 2:
Background and Literature Review
Sailors enlist in the Navy to perform a specific job. However, due to the nature of themilitary,
there are fluctuating periods of high and lowworkload. For most Sailors, the fluctuations are
relatively brief and never include a complete lack of skill-specific work. For some, though,
their sea tours are made up entirely of periods of minimal work or periods of over-work.
Chapter 2 discusses the background information relevant to Sailor utilization and studies
and research related to Sailor workload.
2.1 Background
The United States Navy is a sea-going force, so when a Sailor enlists, there is an expectation
of spending some duty time at sea. During their sea tours, Sailors work long hours, oftenwith
little sleep, little personal time, and little interaction with family and friends. This schedule
is usually maintained for the duration of a six- to eight-month deployment, which occurs
once or twice over the course of a four-year assignment to an operational ship (CNO 2014b).
When the ship is not deployed, Sailors generally have plenty of maintenance, upkeep, and
training to perform, which maintains their skills, but they also get to go home most nights
and weekends.
As outlined in theOFRP (CNO2014b) each ship follows amaintenance-workup-deployment
cycle that spans three years. When an 18-month maintenance period is completed, a ship
is available for deployments for the next 18 months. However, only about 8–9 of those
months are preparing for or executing a deployment. During the remaining period before a
deployment, the crew performs maintenance and training to maintain readiness conditions.
Most rates onboard have skill-specific work to perform during these periods, even though
the ship is in port. For example, information technicians must maintain the communication
networks and computers regardless of the ship’s status; and the ship’s engineering division
can light-off equipment for maintenance or proficiency without the ship being underway.
Other rates, though, such as OSs and quartermasters, do not have major equipment to
maintain, training is limited, and their skill-sets cannot be practiced while in-port. This
leads to periods of under-utilization and skill atrophy for these Sailors.
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All Sailors follow an alternating ship-shore duty assignment rotation, but different rates
spend varying time periods at sea and shore. More sea-centric rates are associated with
demanding work schedules at sea and less demanding work in port. For example, OS is
a very sea-centric rating, so an OS who spends 30 years in the Navy has the following
assignments: six months of initial training, 54 months of sea duty, 36 months on shore duty,
60 months of sea, 36 months on shore, 48 months of sea, 36 months on shore, 48 months
of sea, then 36 months on shore (NPC 2019) (see Figure 2.1). During both the 54- and
60-month sea tours, a Sailor can expect two full deployments with the ship, though some
Sailors end up doing only one deployment in that time. On a 48-month sea tour, a Sailor
usually only deploys once with the ship (CNO 2014b).
Figure 2.1. Typical Sea/Shore Rotation for Operations Specialist Sailors with 30 Years of 
Service. Adapted from Navy Personnel Command (NPC) (2020b).
2.2 Literature Review
Many studies have been done in recent decades that delve into the effects of over work and
under work, and how Navy manning policies affect workload. This section discusses some
of these studies.
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2.2.1 Work Overload and Underload
Game (2007) demonstrates that high boredom in a job coupled with low boredom-coping
skills can lead to non-compliance to safety standards and procedural violations, as well as
less satisfaction with the job. When OS Sailors are in-port, they may not have rate-specific
work that requires strict adherence to procedures, but life onboard a ship requires constant
observation of safety standards and practices. Leaving Sailors bored (i.e., underloaded) for
extended periods can increase their risk-taking (Game 2007), and, at worst, lead to accidents
and further reduced manning. At best, these Sailors remain healthy and safe, but their job
satisfaction diminishes (Game 2007), possibly leading to lower retention rates.
Hebb (1955) similarly concludes that lack of stimulation can lead to increased risk-taking and
frustration, resulting in diminished ability to make reasonable decisions. He also discusses
the other side of the spectrum: over-stimulation. The result of over-stimulation, or work
overload, is similar to that of under-stimulation, namely the inability tomake good decisions.
This is especially relevant on a warship where emergency situations are necessarily a job
expectation, if not a common occurrence.When Sailors are overloaded with daily work, they
may not be prepared to make sound decisions when routinely practiced but out-of-the-norm
things occur, such as a true man-overboard. And they may be unable to respond at all to
major incidents like a hostile attack by another vessel.
For OS Sailors in particular, there is no period of optimal stimulation during a sea tour;
they are either under-loaded in port or overloaded while deployed. As discussed by Game
(2007) and Hebb (1955), this can lead to dangerous situations in which the affected Sailors
are unable to perform their jobs as required in emergent situations, or boredom and lack
of fulfillment, neither of which support retention, or are in line with the CNOs vision of
taking care of our Sailors. Decreased manning in port distributes what little work there is
between fewer Sailors, thus increasing in-port workload. Increased manning on deployed
ships spreads the workload among more people, thus decreasing deployment workload.
These two effects result in a more consistent workload distribution for OS Sailors.
2.2.2 Optimal Manning
In 2001, the Navy implemented an initiative called optimal manning. Optimal manning
was intended to reduce ship manning levels to optimal levels for workload efficiency,
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thereby reducing personnel costs. In 2010, the Navy reversed course after determining
that the initiative had adverse effects on ship readiness (Government Accountability Office
[GAO] 2017). The effects were still felt in 2016 when Congress mandated the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) review into the effects of ship manning policies. This report
concluded, among other things, that “the Navy’s Manpower Requirements process does
not account for all ship workload,” including in-port workload. Recommendations from
the review include a reassessment of the Navy standard workweek as well as criteria for
periodic reassessment, and examination of manpower requirements for in-port workloads.
The Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures document was updated by the
Department of Navy in 2019 to reflect the need for periodic reassessment of Navy standard
workweek and in-port manning requirements. The effects of these updates will take time
to be felt due to new Sailor accession lag time. The result, though, may not address the
mismatch of workload felt by OS Sailors.
2.2.3 The Unresourced Burden on United States Navy Sailors at Sea
Fletcher (2018) conducted interviews with subject matter experts and issued surveys to
Sailors in the fleet in order to better understand and quantify the unresourced burden placed
on Sailors at sea. Based on the responses, she discusses several areas in which a Sailor
spends significant time on tasks that are not accounted for when determining how many
Sailors are required onboard a ship. The areas include things such as waiting (in line,
for a computer, for message routing, for HAZMAT disposal), looking for a single person
necessary for a requirement (single point of failure), maintenance preparation, duplicate
inspections, and emergent training and tasking. She also discusses the tasks that Sailors
shed in order to accomplish their work. The shed tasks include sleep, exercise, healthful
eating, religious ceremonies, cleanliness, cleaning and ship preservation, in-rate training,
career development, mentoring/mentorship, and safety tasks.
Fletcher also identifies and quantifies routine maintenance requirements that are not ac-
counted for in determining manpower requirements for ships, such as annual maintenance.
Based on the number of these requirements and the amount of time they require to com-
plete, she calculates an additional 10 to 17 manpower requirements. However, since those
man-hours are not accounted for, it falls to the Sailors assigned to make up those required
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maintenance hours beyond their regularly accounted for time.
Many of the tasks that are shed to accommodate the work overload are things important
in maintaining a healthy mental state and facilitating career progression. The unresourced
burdens placed onSailors are tasks beyond theNavy standardworkweek. The combination of
making up for under-manning and unresourced burdens requires Sailors to shed important
personal care tasks, cut corners on safety, and/or perform their duties to the minimum
possible standard. None of these results are in line with building a strong, capable and ready
Navy.
2.2.4 An Analysis of Manpower, Personnel, and Financial Policy Deci-
sions on DDG 51 Flight 1 Class Ships
Boschert (2018) reviews recent manpower, personnel, and financial policies and assesses
whether they affected crew size, and if the policies had the desired results. He concludes that
recent policies have improved Sailor productivity metrics without actually improving the
workload of Sailors, or the policies have resulted in increased operational risk. Specifically,
a 3-hour increase to the Total sailor workweek coupled with a decrease in make ready/put
away and productivity allowances assigned more resourced burden on Sailors but did
not change manpower requirements to match the increased burden. Thus, Sailor workload
remained unchanged.With the implementation of OptimalManning, authorized billets were
reduced, but the workload, again, remained unchanged. The discrepancy was accounted for,
concludes Boschert, through an increase in operational risk.
In analyzing the changes tomanning as policies changed, Boschert notes a disparity between
the number of Sailors assumed to be onboard (current onboard [COB]), and the number
actually present onboard (present at quarters [PAQ]). A Sailor may be considered COB, but
not actually be PAQ due to situations such as temporary assignment to training facilities or
the Sailor being on leave. The difference between the two levels of manning account for an
increased workload for those actually PAQ. Boschert calculates that 6.6 extra hours of work
are required by those PAQ to make up for the COB Sailors who are not PAQ. However, that
does not account for the extra hours required to make up for under-manning issues. When all
is accounted for, each Sailor requires over 20 hours more per week to complete all required
work. That is on top of their own Navy standard workweek hours (Boschert 2018).
11




Chapter 3 describes the way in which Sailors move around the fleet throughout their careers
in both the current system and in the proposed new system. It also discusses the model-
types used to simulate Sailor and ship movement over time. This chapter also describes the
assumptions and design associated with the model used for analysis.
3.1 Model Overview
The discrete event simulation (DES) model, referred to as the Fleet Movement Model,
simulates how Sailors move around the fleet throughout their careers, and how ships move
through availability periods and deployments. the FleetMovementModel tracks and collects
statistical data for comparative analysis when using differing input parameters.
3.1.1 Discrete Event Systems and Discrete Event Simulations
As discussed by Schruben and Schruben (2009), a discrete event system is one in which
simulated time does not run continuously. Rather, the system progresses based on events
of interest. Events of interest result in a state change for one or more of the system states.
These events are scheduled on an event calendar, and when one event is complete, the system
jumps to the next scheduled event. Time intervals with no events are skipped in discrete
event systems, making these systems useful in modeling large systems. A DES is a model
of a discrete event system (Schruben and Schruben 2009). An event graph is a graphical
representation of a the system modeled by a DES. A more detailed discussion on how event
graphs work can be found in Appendix A.
3.1.2 DESpy
DESpy is a package designed byDr. Arnold Buss for use in Python to implement event graph
models. From Buss (2018, p. 2), “it provides an Event List for scheduling and executing
events, a base class for defining Event Graph models, many of the standard probability
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distributions, and some classes for computing simple sample statistics from simulation
experiments.”
Buss (2019) discusses transient entities. DESpy tracks the movement of individual com-
ponents throughout the model by using transient entity objects. Each object carries certain
attributes which can be updated as the object moves through the system and can be used in
scheduling events (Buss 2019).
3.2 Concept of Operations
The Fleet Movement Model models two methods of distributing Sailors to a sea tour, the
status quo method and the proposed surge method. The two concepts are discussed in
detail in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The advantages associated with the new surge concept of
operation are detailed in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Status Quo
As the distribution of Sailors works now, when a new OS Sailor is ready to enter the
fleet, their detailer will determine where they are most needed. Each Sailor’s individual
preferences are considered; ultimately, the needs of the Navy come first (CNP 2012).
Once assigned to a ship, the Sailor remains attached to that ship for the duration of their
orders, usually four or five years (Navy Personnel Command (NPC) 2020b). While on the
ship, the Sailor works on earning qualifications to support the OS divisional watch-standing
responsibilities. Once a given level of qualifications is attained, further achievement requires
formal schooling which can be several months long and has a high attrition rate (Settles
2020). If a Sailor chooses to pursue these qualifications, they may be sent to school while
still attached to their ship, or they may attend the school between duty assignments, prior
to reporting to a new ship.
There are often fewer Sailors with these advanced qualifications than are needed on the
ships throughout the fleet. This is due to two main factors: the high attrition rates for the
schools, and the expected quality of life for the Sailors who attain these qualifications. High
attrition is an expected part of a highly skilled qualification and therefore is not addressed in
this thesis. Sailor quality of life, on the other hand, is something that can be changed. When
a Sailor has an in-demand qualification, they are often called upon to support deployments
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beyond those of the ship to which they are assigned. This “borrowing,” or cross-decking,
of Sailors in order to meet minimum manning levels for deployment places an unequal
burden on those Sailors who excel in their careers. It can also cause unpredictability in their
lives when they know they may be sent on a deployment with little advanced notice during
periods when they expect a relatively predictable in-port daily schedule.
When Sailors begin a new sea tour rotation, they can expect to deploy one or two times
during a four- or five-year tour. However, a single deployment is not the norm, so most
Sailors can expect to spend 12 to 18 months deployed per sea tour. Those who only deploy
once can expect to spend six to nine months deployed. The rest of their time onboard is
spent not utilizing their skills because the skills are not relevant to in-port operations (see
Figure 3.1). When a highly qualified Sailor is cross-decked to another ship for deployment,
their skills get used more, but they end up spending an extra six to nine months underway
each time they are “lent” out. Furthermore, even when accounting for borrowed Sailors,
the OS manning levels are below ideal, so the Sailors work longer hours than programmed
for throughout each deployment. This affects all OSs, and leads to an imbalanced workload
between in-port and at-sea periods, but it leads to significantly more over-worked periods
for the highly qualified Sailors. Sailors without the qualification who remain with their
own ship are under-worked while in port, potentially resulting in under-load and boredom,
but more time for home and personal life. The skew for highly qualified Sailors towards
over-work, including greater than 80-hour workweeks, little sleep, and extended time away
from family and friends, can act as an incentive against Sailors trying to attain higher
qualifications, thus further exacerbating the under-manning problem. The increased time
at sea undoubtedly leads to improved advancement opportunities for these Sailors, but
the advantages are weighed against the significant disadvantages when a Sailor considers
whether to reenlist.
When a Sailor completes their sea tour, they are assigned to a shore tour for three years,
during which they do not deploy. However, if the Sailor has a critical qualification, they
may be eligible for SDIP, in which, in exchange for monetary compensation, they elect to
skip their shore rotation and go straight to another ship assignment. The Navy spends half
a million dollars on this incentive programs each year (Jessie 2020), and the result is the
current state of the fleet, which still includes undermanned ships and the need to borrow
qualified Sailors to support deployments.
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In this figure, ships A-G each deploy two times. When a Sailor is assigned to a
single ship, in this case ship A, for a full 60-month tour, they will only support
deployments for that ship. This results in a lot of under-utilized time throughout
the tour while the ship is not deployed. Note that if the Sailor were assigned to
ship D or G, that Sailor would be doing only one full deployment during their tour.
Figure 3.1. Status Quo Concept of Operations
3.2.2 Surge
With the establishment of a surge command, detailing for new OS Sailors remains the
same. After a Sailor’s first sea tour, they become eligible to attend schooling for a critical
qualification. If they have or are willing to attain the qualification, they are eligible for
assignment to the surge command. Assignment to the surge command counts as a normal
sea tour, and thus is proceeded and followed by assignment to a shore tour, according to
standard sea-shore rotations. However, rather than 60- or 48-month orders, as is the standard
rotation length for a second and third sea tour, respectively, Sailors serve for only 24 months
at the surge command.
Sailors not electing or not eligible for assignment to the surge command are detailed to
ships according to the current status quo method of detailing. However, there are fewer
authorized billets required onboard each ship. This allows for a surplus of authorized billets
to accommodate the surge command. With fewer assigned Sailors, there are fewer under-
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utilized man-hours for in-port ships with minimal demand for OS in-rate skills. When a ship
prepares to deploy, it supplements its manning by drawing from the surge command. Sailors
assigned from the surge command to the ship complete pre-deployment workups with the
ship and remain onboard throughout the deployment. Upon return from deployment, the
surge Sailors return to the surge command and be eligible to supplement another deployment.
According to the Navy Personnel Tempo and Operating Tempo Program guidance (CNO
2014a), after a Sailor deploys, they must get enough time off before the next deployment to
make a minimum 1:1 ratio of deployment-to-time-off. To accommodate this, when a surge
Sailor returns from deployment, they are ineligible to support another ship’s deployment
for three months. After the three-month break, the Sailor spends two to three months
assigned to a ship for the ship’s pre-deployment workups. This results in six months between
deployments. If a Sailor does not have enough time remaining at the surge command to
support the full duration of a ship’s planned deployment, they are not eligible to support that
ship’s deployment. In this framework, a Sailor at the surge command can expect to support
two deployments during their surge command sea-tour rotation (see Figure 3.2).
3.2.3 Advantages of a Surge Command
ASailor on a typical status quo sea tour would also expect to complete only two deployments
with their assigned ship, not including time deployed with other ships to which they may
be cross-decked. In this sense, the surge Sailors will likely spend the same amount of
time at sea as their peers not assigned to the surge command. However, there are additional
advantages that comewith assignment to the surge command that could make the condensed
deployment time worthwhile for some Sailors. The first advantage is that the deployments
are expected and can be planned for. When a Sailor is assigned to a ship for a regular sea
tour, and they have the critical qualifications, they know that they may be sent to support
another ship’s deployments with little notice or time to prepare. This uncertainty can have a
negative impact on the Sailor, their family, and their personal pursuits. Electing assignment
to the surge command effectively condenses their sea tour and all the deployments they
would likely face into a shortened, predictable time period.
A second advantage is how a surge command is structured. Since the surge Sailors can
be assigned to any ship in need of supplemental manning, it does not matter where the
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In this figure, ships A-G each deploy two times. When a Sailor is assigned to the
surge command for 24 months they support two deployments on different ships.
In this case, the Sailor can support deployments E1 and C1, E1 and B1, or A1 and
B1. This results in a condensed sea tour with little under-utilization.
Figure 3.2. Surge Concept of Operations
surge Sailor is physically located while awaiting assignment to a ship. Since there is no
specific responsibility placed on surge Sailors between deployments, it does not matter
where the surge command is located. Therefore, a surge location can be established at each
of the major fleet concentration areas, and Sailors electing orders to the surge command
can choose whichever location they prefer. This can give Sailors increased options and
flexibility in when and how their family uproots and moves. A Sailor leaving a shore tour
in San Diego, for example, may find that they would be assigned to a ship in Norfolk if they
chose a conventional sea tour. So, they may elect assignment to the surge command so they
and their family can remain in San Diego.
A third advantage is a concentrated time at sea to improve a Sailor’s chances of promotion.
This would benefit both Sailors who advance strictly by exam results, and Sailors selected
by a board. Time at sea and a willingness to accept orders to assignments with higher
operational temp are associated with increased in-rate knowledge and viewed favorably by
advancement boards (CNP 2019).
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When surge Sailors are not supplementing a deployment, they can spend their time on
military requirements such as General Military Training, further professional qualifications,
militarily encouraged pursuits such as advanced education, mentoring of junior fleet Sailors,
and community relations, such as volunteer service and outreach.
3.3 Simplifications
As a POC, the Fleet Movement Model represents simplifications of actual fleet manning,
Sailor movement, and ship schedule characteristics. Simplifications fall into two broad
categories: Sailor-related and ship-related.
3.3.1 Sailor Simplifications
OSs can earn a range of NECs throughout their careers in order to support operations on
various platforms as well as to increase their responsibilities and knowledge level on any
particular platform. The Fleet Movement Model does not specify Sailor qualifications and
treats each Sailor onboard a ship as qualified to perform all necessary OS-related job tasks.
However, the Fleet Movement Model does include Sailor rank, which can be used as a proxy
for qualifications by ensuring the Fleet Movement Model does not rely on manning ships
with Sailors too junior to have the necessary qualifications for deployments.
The Fleet Movement Model also simplifies the movement of Sailors around the fleet to
force a fixed rotation between sea duty and shore duty, with sea duty assignments either
to a ship or to the surge command. In reality, Sailors may deviate from the fixed sea-shore
rotation, to include doing back-to-back sea tours, or assignment to duty other than sea
duty for extended periods for special circumstances. SDIP is a monetary incentive program
to encourage Sailors to opt for back-to-back sea duty in order to help improve manning
on ships. Excluding the effects of such incentives in the Fleet Movement Model helps to
demonstrate the feasibility of the concept as an alternative to simply “throwing money at
the problem.” With this simplification, the Fleet Movement Model can better demonstrate
to what extent the surge command can ease under-manning problems.
When assigning a Sailor to a ship, the Fleet Movement Model bases the decision on current
manning levels, prioritized by ship phase, and how long the ship has been in its current
phase. In reality, a detailer would consider a combination of a ship’s near-term schedule,
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its current manning levels, the Sailor’s preferences, and available funding when assigning
Sailors to ships. This simplification is necessary in order to create a model of personnel
movement that is not exceedingly complicated for a POC. Any improvement demonstrated
by the Fleet Movement Model will indicate a successful POC; when including the work
of detailers in the assignment process, the results will be further improved. Data from
the fleet movement DES model can be fed into an optimization model (see Appendix B)
to demonstrate the further improvements that can be seen in deployment manning levels
when a detailer decides which ship most needs and available Sailor (human-in-the-loop
improvements).
3.3.2 Ship Simplifications
The scope of this analysis is limited to the DDG 51 FLT I (destroyer) platform, so the Fleet
Movement Model is simplified in that all ships have identical manning needs and authorized
billets. Sailors in the Fleet Movement Model rotate between these ships and shore duty and
never exit the modeled system for assignment to a different platform. This simplification
has little impact on the results because in a more realistically modeled system, each Sailor
would leave the system for a different ship-type, causing another Sailor to enter the system.
Similar to the fixed Sailor rotation, the Fleet Movement Model also simplifies the ships’
schedule to a fixed rotation of available-for-deployment and not-available-for-deployment.
Only ships that are available for deployment can be called to deploy, and they will complete
their scheduled deployment, regardless of whether they shift to a not available status dur-
ing the deployment. Ship schedules are not impacted by maintenance delays or emergent
operational needs. Further, every time a ship returns from deployment, the Fleet Movement
Model immediately schedules another deployment. In reality, there is not always a one-for-
one swap on deployments, and deployments may overlap for a period to allow continuity
on station. These simplifications do not affect the results of the POC and whether the surge
command allows for better Sailor utilization.
For real-world deployments, there are minimum manning requirements. If the minimum
requirements are not met, a ship will supplement by “borrowing” the necessary Sailors from
other ships. the Fleet Movement Model does not enforce minimum manning requirements
for deploying ships. This simplification allows the Fleet Movement Models to show true
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changes to manning levels during deployments.
3.4 Discrete Event Simulation Model Description
the Fleet Movement Model models the fleet of Sailors and Destroyers as entity subclass
objects according to the defined simplifications. Each entity object has inherent methods
that allow for time-tracking, such as “time stamp,” and “get elapsed time.” Sailor objects
enter and leave service, promote, rotate between sea- and shore-duty, and sometimes take
assignment to the surge command. Destroyers (i.e., ship objects) rotate between available-
for-deployment and not-available-for-deployment, with deployments assigned from the list
of ships available to deploy. All of these events are stochastically determined by the Fleet
Movement Model.
Each Sailor object contains attributes defining the Sailor’s current paygrade, their next pro-
motion, when they leave service, their current duty assignment, and when they rotate to their
next assignment. Each ship object contains attributes defining manning level, availability
status, and deployment timing. Each Sailor object is assigned to a ship object. Each ship
object contains the paygrade of each Sailor assigned. When a Sailor promotes, the manning
levels for the old and new paygrades are updated on the ship to which the Sailor is assigned.
When a Sailor rotates, their duty type, rotation, and ship update and the Sailor rank count
for the ship to which they were assigned updates. Figure 3.3 shows the ship and Sailor
attributes and their interactions.
Using the object attributes and entity methods, the Fleet Movement Model collects the
average deployment manning levels and time-average manning levels for each OS paygrade.
Time-average manning levels are determined by tracking the amount of simulated time at
each manning level, then dividing the summed level-time value by the total simulated time.
Since the state trajectories in a DES model are piecewise constant, the summed level-time
value is the area under the state-value curve. the FleetMovementModel also collects a reward
value based on the manning level for each deployment. Whereas the average deployment
manning level is an average over all deployments, the reward value is an aggregate of each
individual deployment. This allows for a simple indication of changes in manning as the
surge percent changes, but it also allows for the results of the Fleet Movement Model to be
compared to the results of an optimization model. The optimization model in Appendix B
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Ship and Sailor objects are entity subclasses (open arrows). Each Sailor object has
a rank, a rotation, a duty type, and a ship (black diamonds). Each ship object
stores Sailor information by Sailor rank (white diamond).
Figure 3.3. Ship and Sailor Attribute Interactions
maximizes the value of reward, calculated in the same way as the Fleet Movement Model.
The Fleet Movement Model executes events until the simulated time reaches 1200. As de-
signed, each time increment represents one month, so the Fleet Movement Model simulates
fleet activities for 100 years. This period of time allows for initial fluctuations to steady
and for the system to reach steady state. the Fleet Movement Model sends some percentage
of eligible Sailors to the surge command, based on input parameters. If the percentage of
eligible Sailors is set to zero, the Fleet Movement Model simulates the status quo system.
A Sailor is deemed eligible for the surge command when they are on any sea tour after their
first one and have not been assigned to the surge command before (i.e., Sailors are only
eligible to serve at the surge command once in their career). In order to compare the effects
of the surge command, the Fleet Movement Model is run for various values representing the
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percentage of eligible Sailors assigned to the surge command. The percentage value starts
at zero, representing the status quo system with no surge command, then is increased in ten
percent increments until one hundred percent of eligible Sailors get assigned to the surge
command. For each percent increment, the Fleet MovementModel is run for 30 independent
replications.
Each replication collects the sum of reward levels for all deployments as well as data
to feed into the optimization model and data for use in validation. The Fleet Movement
Model is proved to be an accurate representation of OS career progression by observing
the distribution of Sailors, both by rank and by type of assignment (i.e., sea or shore),
to be similar to the current distribution of Sailors in the fleet (NPC 2019). The matched
distributions indicate that the Fleet Movement Model simulates movement around the fleet
in a realistic manner (Figure 3.4).
Of note in Figure 3.4(b) is the difference in E5 and E6 levels for sea and shore tours. The
actual current distribution has more E5s at sea than does the Fleet Movement Model, and
fewer E6s at sea than the Fleet Movement Model. The opposite is seen on shore duty,
with the Fleet Movement Model showing more E5s and fewer E6s than in actual current
distribution. This can be explained by the availability of incentives in the actual fleet targeted
towards E5 Sailors. SDIP increases E5 manning levels at sea, therefore shifting shore duty
to later in a Sailor’s career, thus resulting a higher fraction of E6 Sailors on shore duty. The
Fleet Movement Model does not model SDIP so the effects are not expected to be seen in
the Fleet Movement Model results. Similarly, the Fleet Movement Model does not account
for junior Sailors (i.e., E3 and E4 Sailors) that are assigned to shore duty prematurely, which
can happen for a number of reasons including injury or special circumstance. Because of
this, the Fleet Movement Model shows fewer junior Sailors on shore duty than is currently
the case. Finally, this thesis is not concerned with the senior-most Sailors (e.g., E7), so the
Fleet Movement Model ends the career of senior Sailors earlier than is likely, in reality; so
there are fewer E7 Sailors in the Fleet Movement Model than there are in the actual fleet.
3.4.1 The Ships and Their Schedules
The Fleet Movement Model uses 62 ships (representing the 62 DDG-51 Class Destroyers
currently in the fleet) rotating through periods of availability, including not-available-to-
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(a) Overall Distribution of Sailors by Rank
(b) Distribution of Sea and Shore Sailors by Rank
Figure 3.4. Comparison of Actual Current Sailor Distribution by Rank Versus
Model Distribution. Adapted from NPC (2020b).
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deploy, and available-for-deployment. For the purpose of this model, the start of a deploy-
ment is not a separate period of availability as it is in the OFRP (CNO 2014b). Rather, it is
an event that can occur at any time when a ship is in the available-for-deployment period.
See the deployment event in Figure 3.5.
At the start, all ships are routed to either Available for Deployment (A), Not
Available for Deployment (N), or Deployment (D). A ship beginning deployment
prompts a surge of Sailors from the surge Command. When a deployment ends, the
surge Sailors return to the surge Command and a new deployment is scheduled.
Ships rotate between Available for Deployment and Not Available for Deployment.
Figure 3.5. Ship Phase Event Graph
The amount of time each ship spends in each availability phase is based on the OFRP
(CNO 2014b) and each period is simplified for the Fleet Movement Model to be a triangular
distribution, with a mode of 18 months and a max of 24 months. The not-available-for-
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deployment period has a minimum of 12 months, and the available-for-deployment period
has a minimum of 15 months. the Fleet Movement Model starts by sending 15 ships from
the ships available for deployment on deployments. Deployment lengths are modeled as a
gamma distribution with a mean of 6.5 months and a variance of 1.5 months. This is an
assumption based on the expected deployment length as defined in the OFRP.
When a ship ends a deployment, another ship immediately deploys in its place, as long as
there is a ship available. This results in, on average, 15 ships always being deployed. Upon
return from deployment, if a ship is still in the available-to-deploy period, it is not be eligible
for another deployment until three months have passed. This assumption is based on the
minimum time between deployments that Sailors are allowed, per CNP (2019) guidance.
3.4.2 The Sailors
the Fleet Movement Model starts with Sailors assigned to each ship at the current manning
levels. The current level is based on the percent manning for each rank of OS Sailors on sea
duty, as published in the OS community overview (NPC 2019). The community overview
identifies the number of authorized billets for each rank of OS Sailors assigned to sea and
shore duties, as well as the current manning levels to each duty type. The DDG 51 FLT I
Ship Manpower Document Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) 2018 document
identifies how many billets are authorized onboard such ships. The Fleet Movement Model
assumes that each Destroyer is manned at the same percentage-level as the at-sea OS Sailors
across the fleet. Using this standard, each ship in the FleetMovementModel starts with 3 OS
seaman (OSSN) Sailors, 5OS3 Sailors, 10 OS2 Sailors, 3 OS1 Sailors, 1 OS chief (OSC).
There are also 732 Sailors assigned to shore duty for the start of the Fleet Movement Model.
the Fleet Movement Model does not track specific shore duties, but the shore duty shell
is used to hold Sailors while they are between sea duty assignments. 732 is used as the
initial manning level based on the community overview and the ratio of authorized OS
DDG billets to total authorized OS sea billets. There are 4957 authorized OS sea billets, of
which 1,736 are designated for DDGs, or 35%. The ratio is assumed to also represent the
fraction of shore billets filled by Sailors who serve on Destroyers. Therefore, for each rank
of actual OS Sailors on shore duty, 35% of the value was used for that same rank in the Fleet
Movement Model. OS3 are not included on shore duty for the start of the Fleet Movement
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Model because the Fleet Movement Model assumes that each Sailor serves their first tour
on a ship.
Sailor Progression through Career
Periodically, a group of new OS Sailors enters the fleet. It is assumed that they are all OS3
and have completed all initial training. When they enter the Fleet Movement Model, they
are assigned to a ship and begin their first duty rotation. the Fleet Movement Model uses a
triangular distribution to determine when a new class of Sailors arrives, with the minimum
time between arrivals and the mode both being one month. The maximum time between a
new arrival is 4 months. The size of the new class is an exponential distribution with a mean
of 30. These values are based on an interview with the OS Community Manager (Settles
2020). See Figure 3.6
Each Sailor that enters the fleet is assigned the time at which they will leave the fleet. This
time-in-service is modeled as triangular distribution with a mode of 96 months, a minimum
of 54 months and a maximum of 240 months. These values are based on the attrition rates
as shown in the OS community overview (NPC 2019).
The time until a Sailor promotes is a triangular distribution based on their current rank.
OSSN Sailors promote with a mode of 12 months in rank and a minimum of 12 months
and maximum of 24 months. OS3 Sailors promote with a mode of 12 months in rank and a
minimum of 12 months and maximum of 36 months. OS2 Sailors promote with a mode of
66 months in rank and a minimum of 36 months and maximum of 80 months. OS1 Sailors
promote with a mode of 55 months in rank and a minimum of 48 months and maximum of
66 months. For the purposes of this model, no Sailor promotes past OSC. These values are
based on the OS community overview (NPC 2019) and an interviewwith the OS community
manager (Settles 2020).
Sailor Movement through the Fleet
Upon entering the fleet, each Sailor is assigned to a ship based on the following hierarchy:
deployable ships not deployed, ships not available for deployment, deployed ships. The
length of time a Sailor spends at a tour before rotating is based on the expected tour length
for each OS tour (NPC 2020b). For the Fleet Movement Model, each rotation time is a
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Two main scheduled events trigger multiple sub-events: New Class of Sailors enters
the fleet and a Sailor PCSs. When a new class enters, each Sailor in the class gets
scheduled a promotion and a time to exit the fleet. They also get assigned to a
ship. Ship assignment triggers a PCS event in which the Sailor moves between ship
and shore assignment, with the option of surge assignment during a ship tour.
Figure 3.6. Sailor Movement and Career Progression Event Graph
triangular distribution. Based on the NPC 2019 sea/shore rotations, the first sea tour has a
minimum of 51 months, a mode of 54 months, and a maximum of 66 months. The second
and third sea tours have a minimum of 57 months, a mode of 60 months, and a maximum
of 72 months. The fourth sea tour has a minimum of 45 months, a mode of 48 months,
and a maximum of 60 months. Each shore tour has a minimum of 30 months, a mode of
36 months, and a maximum of 42 months. the Fleet Movement Model assumes that Sailors
rotate between sea and shore duty without deviation. Based on the mode length of each tour,
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a Sailor would reach thirty years of service during their fourth shore tour, thus the Fleet
Movement Model does not allow Sailors to go beyond thirty years of service.
When a Sailor transfers from shore duty to sea duty, they are assigned to whichever ship has
the fewest Sailors of the same rank. The hierarchy in case of a tie is ships deployed, ships
deployable but not deployed, then ships not deployable.
Surge Command
When the fraction of eligible Sailors who are assigned to the surge command is greater than
zero, the initial manning level of ships is decreased to 3, 5, 5, 2, and 1, for OSSN, OS3,
OS2, OS1, and OSC Sailors, respectively. The initial manning level for the surge command
is 372, accounting for the six fewer Sailors assigned on each of the 62 ships.
Sailors from the surge command are temporarily assigned to a ship for the duration of the
ship’s deployment. The number of surge Sailors assigned is equal to either the number
of Sailors needed to fully man the ship for deployment (28 (NAVMAC 2018) minus the
number of Sailors currently assigned to the ship), or all the Sailors available to deploy from
the surge command, whichever is lower.
When a ship returns from deployment, the surge Sailors return to the surge command, but
they will not be eligible to supplement another deployment until they have been back for
at least three months. This ensures surge Sailors have the required amount of time between
deployments as required by CNO (2014a).
When a Sailor completes a tour at the surge command, they are no longer eligible to be
assigned to the surge command for future sea tours. Instead, they will serve all future sea
tours assigned to a specific ship.
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The DESmodel simulates the movement of Sailors around the fleet throughout their careers
and themovement of ships throughout theirmaintenance-deployment cycles. It demonstrates
both the currentmodel of Sailormovement and the proposed surgemodel in order to establish
a POC for the new method. Chapter 4 discusses the model results and the success of the
POC.
4.1 Results
As a simulation of a subset of the fleet, the DES model has two basic measures of effec-
tiveness (MOE): a reward value based on the total number of OS Sailors assigned to each
deployment, and the average number of OS2 Sailors assigned to each deployment. Both
MOEs show an improvement as the fraction of eligible Sailors who choose assignment to
the surge command increases.
4.1.1 Deployment Total Manning: Reward Value
Wecalculate the reward value z for each deployment based on the number of Sailors assigned
to that deployment S (Equation 4.1). If 21 or more Sailors are assigned to a deployment,
then a reward of of 1
8
is obtained for the ith additional Sailor beyond 21. Let N denote the
total number of Sailors assigned to a deployment beyond 21 (i.e., S=21 + N ). Then,
I(() =






, if ( = 21 + #, for # > 0.
(4.1)
From the model, with about 2,765 deployments completed per model run, the reward level
steadily increases from zero surge Sailors (status quo) to 100% of eligible Sailors opting for
assignment to the surge command (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1. Trend in Deployment Reward as Surge Percent Increases
4.1.2 OS2 Manning: The Sailors
As expected based on the reward trend line, the OS2manning increases by about two Sailors
from 0 to 100% surge utilization. Since surge Sailors do not complete more deployments
than is the norm for a status quo tour, deployment manning is not expected to increase much.
However, Figure 4.2 demonstrates that there is a lot of variation in the results from each
individual model run. The increase that is seen is caused only by the extra deployments
completed by Sailors who would have only done a single deployment had they done a
regular sea tour.
The average improvement over all runs is an increase of 1.8 Sailors per deployment with
a standard deviation of 0.4 Sailors. This indicates that the surge command can improve
OS deployment manning by, on average, 1 to 2.6 Sailors when all eligible Sailors choose
assignment to the surge command only once in their career. Allowing more than one surge
tour per career would amplify these results.
The fleet movement model does not take into account the human-in-the-loop effect that a
detailer provides when deciding to which ship a Sailor should be assigned. It is reasonable to
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Figure 4.2. Deployment Manning Levels for Increasing Surge Percent
expect a higher manning level for deployments when this effect is accounted for. Appendix B
describes an optimization model that can be used to demonstrate further improved manning
levels for a given surge utilization percent.
Only OS2s are discussed here because Sailors are assigned to the surge command only once
and the surge assignment tends to happen earlier in Sailors’ careers. This is due partially to
model design and simplifications, and partially to the amount of time a typical OS Sailor
spends as an OS2. If Sailors were eligible for assignment to the surge command more than
once per career, OS1 and OSC deployment manning would also be expected to increase.
4.2 Proof of Concept
As a POC, the model was designed to demonstrate whether manning can be improved on
deployments by removing authorized billets from ships that are not deployed and using
those billets to establish a surge command. Aside from improved deployment manning, we
expect to see decreased manning on non-deployed ships, thereby decreasing Sailor under-
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utilization. Figure 4.3 shows the changes in manning on deployed ships as compared to
ships available for deployment, but not deployed, and to ships not available to deploy.
Figure 4.3. Distribution of Sailors as Surge Percent Increases
While deployed ships gain only about two Sailors per deployment, both the deployable and
not deployable ships decrease manning by an average of seven Sailors per ship. With an
average of 45 ships in port, that equates to an average of 315 Sailors who are not being under-
utilized. Rather, they are utilizing their time efficiently by contributing to their expected two
deployments, then moving along in their sea/shore rotation. For the Sailors assigned to the
in-port ships, the little work they have to accomplish is spread between fewer people, thus
increasing their utilization.
The fleet movement model successfully demonstrates that the concept of a surge command
can be used to improve both Sailor utilization and deployment manning without negatively
impacting the Sailors’ career progression or increasing the amount of time they would




Chapter 5 expands on the implications of the results of the POC and proposed future work
to be done in order to fully understand the possible impact of instituting a surge command.
5.1 Discussion
As a successful POC, the DES and this thesis have demonstrated improved manning and
Sailor utilization.What was not included in themodel, but is undoubtedly related tomanning
levels and Sailor utilization are quality of life, promotability, and the effect on reenlistment
decisions. The model assumes Sailors exit the Navy and promote according to the the
current trends. However, the current trends are a result of how many Sailors elect OS as
their rate and how many Sailors choose to reenlist after their initial commitment.
Many OS accessions are Sailors who join the Navy without a specified rate (i.e., undesig-
nated striker), then work on a ship for a while to learn about the different rates available
(Settles 2020) before choosing one of which they will remain for the rest of their career. It
is easy to observe, when stationed aboard a ship, that the OSs spend most of their in-port
time cleaning and most of their underway time standing a port-and-starboard watch sched-
ule. This observation is likely to affect the decision of undesignated striker Sailors when
choosing their future rate. If the workload imbalance is corrected, it is possible that the OS
community would access more junior Sailors, which would increase the manning level of
OS3 Sailors from the current level of 71.6% (NPC 2019).
Furthermore, when a Sailor’s time is better utilized, their skills stay fresh, their deployment
schedules remain relatively predictable, and they gain more say in the geographic locations
to which they are assigned (all of which are accomplished by use of a surge command).
As a result, junior Sailors are more likely to view their Navy experience and their job
positively, which will likely improve not only the quality of their work and safety standards
(Hebb 1955; Game 2007), but also their propensity to reenlist. Improved reenlistment rates
following the initial commitment would improve OS2 manning from the current level of
90.4%.
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With improved accessions and increased reenlistments, the manning level of deployed ships
would continue to improve beyond what is demonstrated by this thesis. With improved
manning on ships, there would be less need for incentive programs like SDIP and high
bonuses for reenlistment. By eliminating SDIP eligibility for OSs , the Navy would save
nearly half a million dollars a year. Lowering reenlistment bonus amounts would increase
the savings.
5.2 Future Work
Following a successful POC, it is prudent to conduct more studies with fewer simplifications
and more details prior to moving forward with the proposed idea. To that end, there is much
more work that can be done to determine the feasibility and practicality of implementing a
surge command.
The model of a ship’s status (available to deploy or not available to deploy) can be refined
to include periods of pre-deployment workups and special assignment missions. These
details would allow surge Sailors to be used for smaller missions, thereby giving more
details regarding how many Sailors are needed at the surge command in order to adequately
support deployments.
Other ship classes can be included in the model to give a more realistic picture of the
fleet-wide effects of a surge command. DDG-51 class Destroyers make up only a fraction
of the total fleet, so including other platforms would allow more Sailors to be eligible for
the surge command. However, there would also be more ships deploying. This could cause
changes to the positive results of this POC.
This model does not differentiate between Sailors who have critical NECs and those who
do not, so it does not provide an accurate look at the effects on manning of critical skills
for deployments. Modifying the model to include NECs will provide a more thorough
understanding of the effects of a surge command on critical skill manning levels. It will also
allow for modeling an increase of Sailors who attain the critical NECs as the quality of life
improves for Sailors with those NECs (i.e., improved deployment manning).
When a Sailor spends more time performing their skill-specific duties, they are better
prepared for advancement exams. Therefore, the model could shorten the time in grade for
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Sailors who are assigned to the surge command. This would provide a more realistic view
of the distribution of Sailors by rank on deployments and throughout the fleet. Similarly,
the model can increase time-in-service for Sailors who are assigned to the surge command
and advance sooner. Improved workload balance and earlier promotion are both likely to
improve reenlistment rates.
Finally, in order to fully understand the possible impact of a surge command, other rates
can be modelled. While OSs are an extreme example of workload imbalance, there are
other rates that could benefit from a more even distribution of work throughout the ship’s
availability cycle.
Aside from expanding the DES model, future work should include Sailor interviews to
better understand the impact of workload balance on quality of life and the subsequent
impact on rate-selection and reenlistment decisions. In addition, the optimization model in
Appendix B can be used to better understand the improvements that come from inclusion
of a detailer when deciding to which ship a Sailor should be assigned.
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Schruben and Schruben (2009) describe how to interpret the edges (lines) and vertices
(circles) of event graphs. Figure A.1 shows two events, A and B, with an edge from A to
B. It depicts that when event A occurs, it may cause event B to occur. If condition (i) is
met, then event B will be scheduled with a time-delay of C. Neither (i) nor C are required
components of any connected events. However, if they are shown on the event graph, their
default values are used, “true” and 0.0, respectively.
Figure A.1. Simple Event Graph. Source: Schruben and Schruben (2009).
Figure A.2 is an example of an event graph with entities, as described by Buss (2019). It
models an arrival process in which a Run event initiates the system to have an empty queue
q and k available servers (S). When a customer entity c arrives, it is added to the queue
(q) and its arrival time is stored as an attribute. If a server is available (S>0), the customer
(c) will be scheduled to start service immediately. At the start of service, the number of
available servers (S) will decrease by 1, the customer (c) will be removed from the queue (q),
and the end of service for customer (c) will be scheduled with a time delay of CB. The start
service event also determines how much time has elapsed since the customer (c) arrived
in the system (D). This is an attribute of customer (c), which references the arrival time to
calculate the elapsed time. When end service is executed, the total time in system (W) is
calculated again using the arrival time attribute of the customer (c). The end service event
also adds a server back to the list of available servers (S), and, if the queue is not empty
(q>0), a start service event will be immediately scheduled.
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This optimization model is designed to be used with the data obtained from this thesis’s
DES model. The parameters and constraints align with those in the DES, and the objective
function mimics the reward value calculated in the DES. However, the optimization is
simplified further to remove rank from the Sailors. This makes the optimization an imperfect
representation of the improvements possible over the DES model, but the optimization
constraints are believed to provide enough restriction to make the results valid and useful.
The parameters should be set to limit each Sailor to the same time in service as theywould be
stochastically assigned in the DESmodel, and to serve the same number of tours throughout
their career as they would in the DES model, including if and when they are assigned to
the surge command. Each ship should start and end deployments at the times they would
according to the DES model. The constraints will then determine the best ship assignment
for each Sailor for each of their sea tours in order to maximize deployment manning. The
reward value will be directly comparable to the reward value from the DES model, and
is an indication of how having a human-in-the-loop (i.e., a detailer) can further improve
deployment manning levels.
Indices and Sets:
B ∈ S = {1,2,3, . . . ,S} : sailors
C ∈ T = {1,2,3, . . . ,T} : tours
? ∈ P = {1,2,3, . . . ,P} : ships
; ∈ L = {1,2,3, . . . ,L} : staffing levels for each deployment
3, 3′ ∈ D = {1,2,3,. . . ,D} : deployments
(3, ?) ∈ SHIP ⊆ D × P : deployment 3 is on ship ?
(3, 3′) ∈ EXC ⊆ D × D : a sailor cannot be assigned to both deployment 3 and
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deployment 3′
C ∈ SEA ⊆ T : tour C is a sea tour
C ∈ SHORE ⊆ T : tour C is a shore tour
(B, C) ∈ SQ ⊆ S × T : tour C is a status quo command sea tour for sailor B
(B, C) ∈ ALL ⊆ S × T : tour C is tour for sailor B
(B, C) ∈ FIRST ⊆ S × T : tour C is the first tour for sailor B
(B, C) ∈ LAST ⊆ S × T : tour C is the last tour for sailor B
(B, 3) ∈ CANDO ⊆ S × D : deployment 3 occurs while sailor B is in service
Parameters:
BC0 5 5; ∈ Z+ : number of sailors at staffing level ; ∈ L
A4|0A33,; ∈ R+ : marginal reward for staffing deployment 3 ∈ D at at least level ; ∈ L
34?BC0AC3 ∈ R+ : start time of deployment 3 ∈ D
34?4=33 ∈ R+ : end time of deployment 3 ∈ D
>=3DC~B ∈ R+ : start time of sailor B ∈ S’s first tour
> 5 5 3DC~B ∈ R+ : end time of sailor B ∈ S’s last tour
<8=;4=CℎB,C ∈ R+ : minimum duration of tour C ∈ T for sailor B ∈ S
<0G;4=CℎB,C ∈ R+ : maximum duration of tour C ∈ T for sailor B ∈ S
Nonnegative Decision Variables:
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() ')B,C : start time of tour C ∈ T for sailor B ∈ S
Binary Decision Variables:
B,?,C : =1 if sailor B ∈ S serves on ship ? ∈ P in status quo tour C ∈ T , 0 otherwise
3,; : =1 if deployment 3 ∈ D is assigned at least BC0 5 5; sailors, 0 otherwise









() ')B,C=1 = >=3DC~B ∀B ∈ S, C ∈ T : (B, C) ∈ FIRST : each sailor begins his or her
first tour at the appropriate time
() ')B,C ≥ () ')B,C−1 + <8=;4=CℎB,C−1 ∀B ∈ S, C > 1 : (B, C) ∈ ALL, (B, C) ∉
LAST : each tour is at least its minimum length
() ')B,C ≤ () ')B,C−1 + <0G;4=CℎB,C−1 ∀B ∈ S, C > 1 : (B, C) ∈ ALL, (B, C) ∉
LAST : 402ℎC>DA8B0C<>BC8CB<0G8<D<;4=Cℎ
() ')B,C=) ≥ > 5 5 3DC~B −<0G;4=CℎB,C=) ∀B ∈ S, C ∈ T : (B, C) ∈ LAST : sailor B’s
last tour must be of an appropriate length
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() ')B,C=) ≤ > 5 5 3DC~B − <8=;4=CℎB,C=) ∀B ∈ S, C ∈ T : (B, C) ∈ LAST : sailor B’s
last tour must be of an appropriate length
() ')B,C ≤ 34?BC0AC3.B,3,C + (>=3DC~B +
∑
C ′<C
<0G;4=CℎB,C ′) (1 − .B,3,C) ∀B ∈ S, 3 ∈
D, C ∈ SEA : (B, 3) ∈ CANDO, (B, C) ∈ ALL : if sailor
B is assigned to deployment 3 in tour C, the deployment’s start timemust occur during the tour
() ')B,C+1 ≥ 34?4=33.B,3,C ∀B ∈ S, 3 ∈ D, C < ) : C ∈ SEA, (B, C) ∈
CANDO, (B, C + 1) ∈ ALL : if sailor B is assigned to deployment 3 in tour C,






.B,3 ′,C ≤ 1 ∀B ∈ S, (3, 3′) ∈ EXC : (B, 3) ∈ CANDO, (B, 3′) ∈








∀3 ∈ D, ; ∈ L : deployment 3
must have at least BC0 5 5; sailors assigned in order to accrue the appropriate marginal reward
.B,3,C ≤ B,?,C ∀(3, ?) ∈ SHIP, (B, C) ∈ SQ : (B, 3) ∈ CANDO : sailor B cannot




B,?,C = 1 ∀(B, C) ∈ SQ : sailor B is assigned to a ship in each status quo sea tour
B,?,C = 0 ∀B ∈ S, C ∉ SEA, ? ∈ P : sailor B is not assigned to a ship in any shore tour
B,?,C ∈ {0, 1} ∀B, ?, C : define decision variable domains
3,; ∈ {0, 1} ∀3, ; : define decision variable domains
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.B,3,C ∈ {0, 1} ∀B, 3, C : define decision variable domains
() ')B,C ≥ 0 ∀B, C : define decision variable domains
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